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We investigate the impact of corporate governance on accounting and market performance 
relationships of family firms during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We expect the monitoring aspects 
of corporate governance to compliment the long-term orientation of family firms improving the value 
relevance of accounting and market performance during times of exogenous financial shocks such as the 
(GFC). We find that the family-firm value is more sensitive to book value than earnings changes. We also 
find better corporate governance, irrespective of whether it is a family firm or non-family firm, is 
associated with better accounting and market performance during the GFC. 
 
Key words: Corporate governance, family business, accounting performance, firm value, market 
performance, Global Financial Crisis.  





A central premise of family firm research is that family firms exhibit superior accounting 
performance and market performance relative to non-family firms. This is due to the controlling family’s 
unique long term orientation, ownership and governance attributes (Pérez-González 2006; Villalonga and 
Amit 2009; Maury 2006; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006; Miller et al. 2007; Hongfeng, Xiao, and 
Xiaoquan 2017; Wang and Shailer 2018; Dyer 2006). We extend this literature by exploring the impact 
of good corporate governance practices on the accounting performance and market performance of family 
firms during the exogenous financial shock of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
The GFC exposed firms to significant external shocks including low finance liquidity, overnight 
failure of customers and markets, downturns in revenue, spikes in uncertainty and pronounced negative 
sentiment (Crottry 2009; Matt 2012; Grillitsch and Tavassoli 2018; Kim, Kim, and Lee 2015).  These 
adverse conditions tested the ability of the firm managers and owners to marshal resources and develop 
strategies to allow the firm to respond to the external shock and therefore perform and survive. The 
question we explore is whether good governance and family control differentially impact accounting 
performance and market performance in such circumstances. On the first point, we can draw on the large 
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body of research that asserts good corporate governance positively affects firm performance. The 
empirical evidence finds mixed support for this proposition, partly due to confounding endogeneity issues 
(Black, Love, and Rachinsky 2006; Schultz, Tan, and Walsh 2010; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Miller et al. 
2007; Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven 2011; Dwivedi and Jain 2005; Martínez and Requejo 2017; Xie 
2015). Researching disequilibrium situations such as the GFC, where the governance driver of 
performance should matter more and therefore differentially affect firm performance, potentially 
addresses the conflicting results and endogeneity concerns. Johnson et al. (2000) find a significant 
positive impact of governance during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) however Gupta, Krishnamurti, 
and Tourani-Rad (2013) find that well governed firms do not outperform firms with poor governance 
across a sample of developed countries. In contrast Aldamen et al. (2012) find that governance enhancing 
Audit Committee characteristics mitigate the firm performance impact of the GFC for Australian firms. 
Finally recent evidence suggests that the financial monitoring dimension of governance (audit committee 
characteristics) positively impacts discretionary accruals quality and that this mitigating effect is 
amplified during the GFC (Aldamen and Duncan 2016; Bryce, Ali, and Mather 2015; Medhat et al. 2018). 
While the impact of good governance during the GFC is attracting researchers, there is only 
limited evidence on the performance impact of family control during periods of financial crises. Most 
family-firm research is conducted in periods of stable markets and the conventional wisdom is that family 
firms exhibit higher accounting profitability (ROA) and market performance (Tobin's Q or price-to-book 
value (P/B) ratio). Despite the conventional wisdom there are studies that find either no or a negative 
family effect on performance, suggesting there is an opportunity for further research in this area (Chua et 
al. 2018) . Two contemporaneous studies provide conflicting evidence on the relative market performance 
during the GFC of family firms and non-family firms. Lins et al. (2013) show that family firms, defined 
as firms with more than 25% ultimately controlled by a family, underperformed the market. In contrast, 
other non-family, block-holder controlled firms, outperformed the market in the GFC and Lins et al. 
(2013) argue that the performance difference is due to the family consumption of private benefits during 
the GFC. However, the negative relation for family firms is driven by firms in emerging markets and the 
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result does not hold for developed markets.1  Zhou et al. (2013) and Wang and Shailer (2018), find family 
firms do not significantly outperform non-family firms during the crisis in terms of accounting 
performance (ROA) and market performance (Tobin’s Q) except where the founder was actively involved 
as CEO, a board member or a significant block-holder. Where the founder is still involved, the firm shows 
significantly higher accounting performance, but market performance is not significantly different to non-
family firms.   
This last finding is puzzling given the value relevance literature suggests that accounting 
performance drives market performance (Wang and Shailer 2018; Alexander 2016; Lin, Liu, and Noronha 
2016). Thus, we would expect family control to positively impact accounting performance and for this to 
translate to a positive impact on market performance. The implication of Zhou et al.’s (2013) evidence is 
that accounting performance is less value relevant for family firms during the GFC. This affect may not 
be uniform for all family firms. Lins et al. (2013) and Zhou et al. (2013) only consider the control aspect 
of governance and do not consider other aspects of the family firm’s governance environment, in 
particular audit oversight, that may mitigate the propensity to consume private benefits during the GFC. 
We know from the governance literature that adopting better corporate governance practices, such as an 
enhanced audit committee, quality external auditors, and board independence, improves monitoring of 
management and reduces information asymmetry problems (Aldamen et al. 2012; Aldamen and Duncan 
2016). Firms with better corporate governance are expected to exhibit a stronger accounting-market 
performance relevance relationship (Chalmers, Clinch, and Godfrey 2011; Choi, Kim, and Lee 2011; 
Christensen et al. 2015; Koh, Laplante, and Tong 2007).  
We contribute to the family and governance literatures by investigating the GFC accounting-
market performance relationship for family controlled Australian firms. The 2008-2009 GFC differs from 
prior financial crises in that just prior to the GFC Australia, like many jurisdictions, imposed significant 
and costly governance requirements aimed at improving the monitoring, financial disclosure and control 
                                                 
1 Lins et al. (2013) find no significant market performance differences for family controlled firms in developed markets for 
their sample of 40 countries which excluded the United States (US). 
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of public firms. The “if not why not” more flexible corporate governance regime in Australia coupled 
with the natural experimental context of the GFC, represents a rich context in which to explore the 
interaction of family control and corporate governance systems in place. We argue that good-governance 
practices should complement family ownership and long-term orientation and result in greater monitoring 
and transparency, improved financial decision making, and enhanced risk assessment. If governance 
matters, then family-controlled firms with good corporate governance practices are less likely to engage 
in value destroying consumption of private benefits during the GFC and hence their accounting 
performance will have a higher value relevance to the market.  
Our contribution is to show that a firm’s internal governance mechanisms mitigate the impact of 
the GFC, when it should matter most, and enhances the value relevance of accounting performance. We 
show that this result applies to both family and non-family firms.  Consistent with the positive accruals 
quality-governance-GFC association documented by Aldamen and Duncan (2016) we find better 
governance, irrespective of whether the firm is family or non-family, is associated with higher accounting-
market performance relation during the GFC. We also find that accounting earnings are more value 
relevant for family firms during the GFC but that adopting good governance results in a reduced 
accounting-market performance relation. This evidence suggests that the internal governance 
environment of a firm, rather than the firm’s control characteristics, is the important performance driver 
in periods of financial shock. In addition, family control and good governance appear to behave more like 
substitutes than compliments. 
We introduce the notion of socioemotional wealth (SEW), which refers to the firm’s non-financial 
characteristics that respond to the family’s affective needs. Examples include family identity, influence, 
and succession from one generation to the next (Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007; Berrone, Cruz, Gómez-Mejía 
and Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Berrone, Cruz and Gómez-Mejía, 2012). We suspect that during periods of 
financial difficulties, good corporate governance increases chances of survival for family firms. This is 
evident in the higher emphasis on earnings during periods of financial distress relative to pre-GFC period. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that the market expects residual sub-optimal decisions by family firms in 
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attempt to preserve their SEW rather than maximising firm value. Although we find a positive governance 
effect consistent with the internal financial distress, the governance impact is not as strong as for non-
family firms. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section two reviews prior literature and distils 
the key theoretical relationships between performance and corporate governance for family and non-
family firms. Three empirical value relevance models are developed for testing these relationships. 
Section three describes the research design which includes the sample, variable measures and the 
empirical methods used to measure the relationship between corporate governance and performance for 
family and non-family firms.  Section four presents the data and the results for estimation of the models.  
Finally, section five offers a discussion of the results and their implications as well as a conclusion to the 
paper. 
2. Literature Review and Model Development  
Our starting premise is that family firms outperform non-family firms due to distinct differences 
in management and control mechanisms and the unique bonds that link the family to the firm (Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira 2009; Manjon 2007; Pérez-González 2006; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006; 
Maury 2006; Chen et al. 2005; Mak and Roush 2000; McConaughy et al. 1998; Short 1994; Holmes and 
Zimmer 1994). The family-firm literature has established factors such as long-term orientation and 
unique-intangible assets that differentiate family firms. Evidence suggests that these family-firm factors 
are associated with family firms outperforming non-family firms.  
More recently the literature recognised that the decision making process for family controlled 
firms is different when compared to non-family controlled firms (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011; Dobler 2014; 
Hashim and Amrah 2016; Sakinah Azizan 2012).  Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) argue that families place 
great importance on preserving their control, identity and family dynasty. Family firms also value 
harmony amongst family members, upholding their public image and succession from one generation to 
the next (Berrone, Cruz, and Gómez-Mejía 2012; Lohe and Calabrò 2017). Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) 
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note that in some cases the blending of family and firm is to the point that the two become intertwined 
generating a strong emotional attachment between the family and the firm. 
While achieving positive financial results is a key goal for non-family firms, family firms have an 
additional incentive to prioritize non-financial results in order to maintain family influence and fulfil the 
family’s objectives (Angulo, Villanueva, and Solís 2016; DeTienne and Chirico 2013). Furthermore, 
family firms may take on added financial risk to preserve their emotional connection with the firm 
(Gómez-Mejía et al. 2014). This socioemotional bond between the family and the firm is a form of wealth 
that families use as a reference point for decision-making (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007).  In the event that 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) is threatened, the family will be loss averse, to protect their endowment of 
SEW, consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus family firms may make 
decisions that are financially unprofitable to protect their SEW (Berrone, Cruz, and Gómez-Mejía 2012; 
Berrone et al. 2010). Evidence shows that family firms will reject decisions that enhance financial 
performance if these decisions negatively impact the family’s SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Berrone 
et al. 2010; Leitterstorf and Rau 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2014) although this effect depends on the 
generational stage and whether or not the firm has a family CEO or family dominated board (Gottardo 
and Moisello 2015; Vandemaele and Vancauteren 2015).  
The question is how family firms will behave when faced with a crisis. Will they sacrifice financial 
wealth to preserve SEW? A recent paper by Lohe and Calabrò (2017) finds that during internal financial 
crisis or distress, families seek to preserve control and reputation and thus SEW at the expense of financial 
performance of their firms. It is an empirical question whether or not this limited internal distress evidence 
will translate to Australian-family firms dealing with the GFC. It could be that the exogenous nature of 
the GFC focused family firms on financial survival as to preserve future potential SEW. Our proposition 
is that preserving SEW and financial wealth are aligned incentives during the external GFC shock.  This 
is due to the tie between the family and firm performance and survival. 
 
Proposition 1: Family firms outperform non-family firms during the GFC. 
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To explore this proposition we employ Ohlson’s (1995) valuation framework that models value 
as a function of earnings and book value.  The core accounting information signals capture the 
performance of management, be they family or non-family management teams. This relationship can be 
specified as market to book value as a function of earnings to equity ratio or return on equity (ROE) as 
follows:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛾𝛾1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄     (1) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is market value of firm i in period t, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is firm i’s earnings for period t and 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the book value of equity for firm i at the end of period t. The family firm literature has tested two aspects 
of the relation in equation (1): namely whether the dependent variable (market to book value), a measure 
of market value, and the independent variable (earnings to equity), a measure of accounting performance, 
are different between family and non-family firms. Typically market value is operationalised as market 
to book value (or price to book value, P/B), a proxy for Tobin’s Q (the left hand side of equation (1)) 
(Black, Jang, and Kim 2006; Dwivedi and Jain 2005; Chen, Guo, and Mande 2003; Callahan, Millar, and 
Schulman 2003; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Lemmon and Lins 2003). Accounting performance 
is typically operationalised as return on equity (the right-hand term in equation (1)) or a derivation such 
as return on assets (ROA – where ROA adjusted for leverage is ROE).  
What does the aggregate evidence based on these measures tell us? If we consider the value 
relationship in equation (1), then it could be that the observed higher Tobin’s Q for family firms is due to 
higher earnings or return on equity. However the conflicting earnings evidence in the literature (Hasso 
and Duncan 2010; Duncan and Moores 2014) suggests that the nature of the innovation is more complex 
or that there are other factors that are not specified. Nevertheless there is fairly consistent evidence that 
family firms exhibit higher Tobin’s Q (Black, Jang, and Kim 2006; Dwivedi and Jain 2005; Chen, Guo, 
and Mande 2003; Callahan, Millar, and Schulman 2003; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Lemmon and 
Lins 2003). If this observed result is not due to earnings innovations for family firms (as captured by ROE 
or ROA) then the value relation suggests an alternative argument that family firm factors impact the fixed 
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effect or slope coefficients (α0 and γ1) (equation (1). A larger slope parameter means family firms exhibit 
a higher earnings capitalisation parameter or price-earnings (PE) ratio for any given level of earnings.   
The implication for valuation is that researchers need to focus on the factors that impact the slope 
coefficient rather than earnings per se to better understand the drivers of family firm value. One such 
factor is the nature of the corporate governance adopted by the firm. We argue that if governance has a 
role in increasing firm performance and value, as suggested by the prior theory and evidence (Brown and 
Caylor 2009; Klein 1998; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009; Miller et al. 2007; Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou 2007; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006), then this effect should be most evident when the 
firms face adverse circumstances and be amplified for family firms. In the unique form of shareholder 
activism permitted in Malaysia, Azizan and Ameer (2012) show that family firms respond to governance 
pressure to improve performance over time. 
Often firms manage shocks that are endogenous while on other occasions they are completely 
exogenous such as the GFC. We expect that the governance impact during the GFC should manifest in 
greater monitoring and transparency, improved financial-decision making, and improved risk assessment. 
We propose that family firms (due to their unique family factors) with better corporate governance (more 
formal governance in place) will outperform other firms. This view is consistent with Lohe and Calabrò 
(2017) finding that family firm boards that contribute financial governance perform better during internal 
financial crises as well as the broader consensus about the positive effects of competent family firm boards 
during firm crises (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2013). 
 
Proposition 2: Better corporate governance will contribute to the performance difference of family firms 
during the GFC. 
 
To explore proposition two, we reformulate the value relationship as a returns analysis by taking 
first differences to arrive at an estimable model where return for firm i in period t, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is a function of  
firm i’s earnings for period t, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and the additional earnings impacts for family factors (FF) and corporate 
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governance (GOV). To test this relation, we estimate the reduced form model including controls for size, 
leverage, age, and industry dummies as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   Model (1) 
Model (1) suggests that returns for family firms is impacted by family factors and governance 
factors via slope dummy variables. We also investigate several derivations of Model (1). In addition to 
market returns analysis we also consider a two levels specification drawing on the Ohlson (1995) 
formulation in Models (2) and (3) as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                   Model (2) 
 
Where 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is book value of the net assets firm i in period t. Dividing Model (2) by total assets 
and assuming that the book value ratios are captured by the intercept gives Model (3). From this, we get 
Tobin’s Q as a function of return on assets (ROA) with slope dummies for family firms and governance 
(similar to equation (1) earlier). 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  Model (3)  
3. Data, Variables and Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
We focus on publicly listed family firms because they are required to disclose information about 
their governance environment, a requirement which does not apply to private family firms. Our initial 
sample consists of 2293 non-financial companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
from 2007 to 2010. This period captures just before the GFC in 2007 through to 2010 that is arguably the 
end of the worst of the GFC for Australian firms. One down side of choosing this period is it creates a 
survivorship bias in our sample. However, we argue that the governance-family control impact on failure 
is beyond the scope of this study and we leave the study of firms that failed during the GFC to future 
papers.  The final sample was 645 once we exclude non-trading companies and those with missing, 
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incomplete data or extreme values. Of these 123, or about 19%, are identified as family firms in prior 
research (Yupitun 2008).  The data was collected from annual reports and database information from 
MorningStar’s DatAnalysis and Bloomberg. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
3.2 Variables  
The definition of family firms is a challenge for family business researchers and has been cited as 
a possible explanation for the mixed and conflicting results (Miller et al. 2007; Duncan and Moores 2014). 
We define a firm to be a family controlled firm when the family is the largest shareholder and is 
represented by one officer or director which is consistent with other major Australian and international 
studies of family firms (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Yupitun 2008).  This is a richer definition than the 
family control literature (for examples see the performance-GFC-family control papers by (Lins, Volpin, 
and Wagner 2013; Zhou, Wang, and He 2013)) that focuses on block holdings as the measure of family 
connection to the firm. We capture family firm control in our analysis with a dummy family firm variable, 
FF, which equals one for family-controlled firms and zero otherwise. 
Corporate governance measurement presents another challenge to researchers as there is no 
dominant measure in the literature. Nevertheless, recent research focuses more on composite governance 
indices than single governance measures (Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven 2011). The use of indices 
reflects the emerging theme that good governance does not mean uniform governance across companies 
(Filatotchev, Toms, and Wright 2006) and is more consistent with the ‘if not why not’ governance 
regulatory environment in Australia. Therefore, rather than focus on the level of individual governance 
dimensions, which might not capture the variability in governance climate between family and non-family 
firms, we compute a governance index that reflects the firms’ aggregate governance structure. We employ 
twelve individual governance variables to capture the multi-faceted governance concept, drawn from the 
prior literature and defined in Table 2 (Fama and Jensen 1983b; Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh 2006; 
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Ang, Cole, and Wuh Lin 2000; Kent and Stewart 2008).  The individual governance measures include 
board size, board independence, duality of the role of board chair and chief executive officer, frequency 
of board meetings, the presence of nomination and remuneration committees, audit committee charter, 
size of audit committee, audit committee independence, financial expertise of the audit committee, audit 
committee meetings and Big Four external auditor.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
Consistent with previous literature we compute a corporate governance composite index that 
summarises the twelve individual corporate governance variables into a single index of governance 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Defond, Hann, and Hu 2005; Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven 2011).  
All governance variables are transformed to a binary scale by allocating a value of one if the individual 
corporate governance variable is above the sample median and zero otherwise. The twelve dichotomous 
variables are summed to produce a governance composite, GovIndex, which has a maximum value of 
twelve (indicating strong corporate governance) and a minimum value of zero (indicating weak corporate 
governance) (Defond, Hann, and Hu 2005) as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 =  �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖12
𝑗𝑗=1
 
Where 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an aggregate index of corporate governance for firm i and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖is the 
jth individual corporate governance variable for firm i (see Table 2). We classify the top quartile on the 
GovIndex as good governance and use a dummy variable, GOV, to represent this in our analysis where 
one is good governance (where GovIndex ≥ 8) and zero otherwise. We also include controls for size, 
leverage, age and industry in the estimation models. Company size, SIZE, is the log of total assets. 
Leverage, LEV, is measured as total debt divided by total assets.  Company age, AGE is the number of 
years since incorporation.  Finally, industry is measured using a fixed effect model with standard errors 
clustered by industry. 
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3.3 Methodology 
Prior research identifies governance to be endogenously determined.2  Specifically, there are 
concerns about the relationship between governance characteristics of the board, firm performance and 
the endogeneity that may be implicit in this relationship (Schultz, Tan, and Walsh 2010; Gippel, Smith, 
and Zhu 2015; Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven 2011).  The specific issue is whether a firm’s performance 
drives the board structure and governance features or the board drives performance, or whether some 
other variable drives both. The CEO is an obvious candidate for the latter.  It is argued that the nature of 
governing boards today are significantly different from boards in the 1960s (Bhagat and Black 1999) and 
that these changes are driven by adverse shocks to the market such as the 1987 stock-market crash 
(Cadbury 1999), the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s (Miller 1998), the internet bubble of 2000 
(Thornton and Marche 2003) and finally the 2008-2009 GFC which is the subject of our study.  Our 
proposition is that governance matters to a far greater extent when there is an unexpected exogenous 
shock; that is, the governance comes into prominence when expectations are not met in a rapidly altered 
external environment. By choosing an exogenous and largely unexpected event, we assess the 
governance-performance relationship before the performance can affect the composition of the board. 
That is, the research design controls for the implicit endogenous effect (Aldamen et al. 2012; Aldamen 
and Duncan 2016; Gippel, Smith, and Zhu 2015; Jiraporn et al. 2018; Shuo and Stephen 2018).   
4. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The average market return for 2008 is negative for the pooled sample and for the family and non-
family firm sub-samples reflective of the down turn due to the GFC. As shown in Figure 1 the 2006-07 
period is very prosperous on average for firms but the GFC negatively impacted returns in 2008 and 2009 
only to rebound in 2010. Figure 1 also shows that the All Ordinaries market index dropped from a high 
at the end of 2007 to about half that level in early 2009.  
                                                 
2 Endogeneity issues plague much of the governance (see Brown et al. (2011) for a review) and more generally accounting 
(see Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for a review) and finance literature see Bhagat and Bolton (2008)). 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the models are reported in Table 3 for the pooled 
sample and for the family and non-family firm sub-samples. We also report the results for an ANOVA 
testing the equivalence of the variable means for family and non-family firms. The results show that only 
two of the univariate variables are significantly different between family and non-family firms. 
Furthermore, family firms carried more debt in 2008 than non-family firms, are less likely to make losses 
over two or more sample years and are more profitable in 2007 and 2008 than non-family firms. The 
result also indicates that thirty percent of non-family firms exhibit good governance compared to 24% of 
family firms but the difference in means is not significant at the 10% level. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
4.2 Model Estimation 
We estimate the returns and levels models developed earlier to test whether better corporate 
governance impacts the performance and valuation of family versus non-family firms before (2007), 
during (2008) and coming out of the GFC (2009).  Using a pooled model would be ineffective because it 
averages out the context effects. We are specifically interested in the differences and impacts that the 
models would have for the individual years. Additionally, we include industry fixed effects in each model 
rather than random effects based on a Hausman test. Firm fixed effects are not included as this would 
greatly reduce degrees of freedom. We also do not adopt the common Fama–MacBeth (FM) standard 
errors as we only have three time periods of data. Using the FM approach on such a limited time period 
would be noisy. Instead we employ robust standard errors clustered by industry (Gow, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor 2010).      
Table 4 reports the results for the three accounting performance-value models estimated. To test 
the slope effects as theorised, we convert the GovIndex variable into a dummy variable GOV as defined 
earlier. We code the top quartile as good governance as these are the firms that tend to have stronger 
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committee and audit governance features, which we expect to have a greater impact on performance 
during the GFC (Aldamen et al. 2012; Aldamen and Duncan 2016). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Model (1) examines the relationship between market returns, earnings and the impact of family 
and governance factors. The results in Table 4 show that returns, for the period 2007-09, are not related 
to earnings and neither the family control nor governance factors change this relationship. The 
explanatory power of Model (1) is low and thus the majority of the explanation is simply the large 
exogenous impact of the GFC on market prices in 2008.   
In Model (2), a levels model, we explore the relationship between market value (share price), 
earnings and book value. The results in Table 4 indicate that share price is positively related to earnings 
and book value at the 1% level respectively for all years. This is consistent with the standard Ohlson 
(1995) valuation framework. Interestingly across the three years the coefficients on earnings (X) and book 
value (BV) both decrease. There is also a positive earnings-family firm slope effect (X*FF) for 2007 and 
2009 but not 2008. This suggests that the earnings for family firms are more value relevant than for non-
family firms at least in 2007 and 2009. It is possible that this reflects that fewer family firms are consistent 
loss makers. We will return to this issue later to consider differential models for loss making and profitable 
firms. The slope dummy for book value for family firms is not significant in any year suggesting assets 
have a similar valuation weighting for family and non-family firms.  
Significantly we find good governance has a positive impact on the accounting-market 
performance relation. For the period 2007-09, the slope coefficient for earnings is higher for good-
governance firms (X*GOV is positive) with a corresponding lower book value weight (BV*GOV is 
negative). This indicates that higher governance is associated with a higher earnings weight but a lower 
book value weight in the valuation model.  However, for the same period, share price is negatively related 
to earnings for family firms with good governance (X*FF*GOV is negative). These lower earnings 
weights for family firms with good governance partly offsets the positive family-earnings slope 
coefficient (X*FF significant in 2007 and 2009). However, these family firms have a higher book value 
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weight relative to non-family firms (BV*FF*GOV is significant 2007 and 2009).  The exception is 2008 
where family firms with good governance do not exhibit any additional positive slope weight for book 
value.  These results suggest that family firms with higher governance had a lower book value weight but 
higher earnings weight in 2008 during the GFC. Finally, firm value is negatively related to age in 2007 
and 2008 but unrelated to size and leverage in any of the periods.  
These results suggest that, during the GFC, earnings rather than book value drove the market value 
for good-governance firms. This is consistent with the accruals quality-governance-GFC relation 
identified by Aldamen and Duncan (2016). Family firms had a higher emphasis on earnings as well, but 
this was reduced for family firms with good governance except in 2008. Noting that family firm earnings 
were higher (fewer loss makers) than non-family firms. Conversely the value for low governance firms 
emphasised book value more than earnings.  
Family firms’ focus on preserving SEW might help explain the result for family firms. During 
periods of non-financial distress, higher-level governance could translate into less family control, as 
various processes are put in place to monitor and control managerial behaviour, putting downward 
pressure on SEW. However, during times of financial distress, these same governance measures might 
have an opposite effect, increasing chances of survival for these firms. Consistent with Lohe and Calabrò 
(2017), governance helps in distressed periods in our case increasing the earnings coefficient relative to 
the governance effect in 2007.  However, this applies to all well governed firms and is not unique to the 
family firms. The positive governance effect is lower for family firms in all years for the price model. 
We also explore the relationship between Tobin’s Q and earnings, governance, and the impact of 
family control in a final levels specification - Model (3). The results in Table 4 show that Tobin’s Q is 
negatively related to profitability (ROA) at the 1% significance level for the years 2007 and 2009 but not 
2008 during the GFC. This negative relation is amplified for family-controlled firms in 2009 (ROA*FF 
is significantly negative in 2009). However, Tobin’s Q is positively related to profitability for firms with 
good governance during the crisis in 2008 and coming out of the crisis in 2009. Profitable firms with good 
governance are valued more highly. The negative family firm profitability weight in 2009 (significant at 
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the 5% level) was partially offset by a significantly positive coefficient for profitability for firms with 
good governance (ROA*GOV). However, there is no combined profitability-family-governance effect 
(ROA*FF*GOV is not significant). These results might partly be explained by unreported ANOVA 
analysis that shows that firms with higher governance have lower Tobin’s Q or market to book ratio but 
are significantly more profitable (higher ROA, earnings per share and aggregate earnings over time and 
also less likely to have a loss). 
 
 
4.3 Robustness Analysis 
We find a significantly higher proportion of non-family firms repeatedly report losses (negative 
EBIT) in 2007 and again during the GFC period (see Table 3, Xt). Fifty percent of non-family firms are 
repeat loss makers whereas only thirty-one percent of family firms are repeat loss makers. This suggests 
the value drivers might be different for family and non-family firms. To further explore the role of family 
control and governance in valuation during the GFC we re-estimate the three valuation models separately 
for the loss making and non-loss making firms. We define loss makers as those firms that reported a loss 
in 2007 and again in either or both 2008 and 2009. We code the variable LOSS as one for loss markers 
and zero otherwise and split the sample based on this variable. Table 5 reports the returns Model (1) re-
estimated for each year with separate coefficients for loss makers and non-loss makers. The market return 
for loss makers is positively related to earnings in 2007 at the 10% significance level but negatively 
related to earnings in 2009 at the 5% significance level.  The negative returns relation for loss makers in 
2009 is less for family and good-governance firms with both X*FF and X*GOV having significant 
positive impacts on returns.  There is no significant accounting-market performance relation for non-loss-
making firms. These results present an inconsistent pattern when compared to earlier results reported in 
Table 4. This is potentially due to the simplified earnings-only focus of Model (1).  In unreported analysis 
we also run this model with change in earnings as well as earnings and associated slope dummies for 
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family and governance status. We find that the change in earnings variable was not significant, no models 
exhibited significant explanatory power and the tenor of the results was largely unchanged. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 6 reports the re-estimated price Model (2) for loss makers versus non-loss makers. The 
valuation weights are quite different for loss maker relative to profitable firms. Share prices for loss 
making companies are negatively related to earnings (which are losses) in 2007 at the 5% significance 
level but are not significantly related to earnings in 2008 or 2009.  However, the value of loss makers is 
positively related to book value for the period 2007-09 at the 1% significance level.  This indicates that 
loss makers are increasingly valued on book value between 2007 and 2009 with reducing earnings and 
increasing book value weights. This effect is more pronounced for family firms with the X*FF coefficient 
negative in each year and the book value coefficient (BV*FF) positive in 2008.  This suggests that loss 
making family firms are valued even less on earnings and more on book value in 2008. Good governance 
reduced the book value weight (significant in 2008) but did not increase the earnings weight for loss 
makers.  
In contrast, the share price for non-loss makers is positively related to earnings at the 1% 
significance level for 2007 and 2008 and at the 5% significance level for 2009.  Furthermore, share price 
is also positively related to book value in 2007 and 2009 (significant at 5% level or better).  Non-loss 
making family firms and firms with higher governance were valued more on earnings and less on book 
value. However, the positive impact of governance and family control were lower where both factors 
were present (X*FF*GOV is negative). The model explained a lot more of the value of profitable firms 
than for loss makers reflecting the role of expected future earnings not just book value and capitalised 
current earnings in valuation. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
We find a similar pattern of results for loss versus non-loss firms for Tobin’s Q Model (3) reported 
in Table 7.  Tobin’s Q for loss making firms is negatively related to profitability at the 1% significance 
level for the period 2007-09 and negatively related to firm size but only for 2007.  However, for non-loss 
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makers, Tobin’s Q is positively related to profitability at the 1% significance level for 2007 and 2009. 
Furthermore, there is a strong positive impact by profitability on Tobin’s Q for non-loss-making family 
firms and firms with good governance. However, these factors are offset to some extent by the 
profitability impact for family firms with good governance (ROA*FF*GOV is significantly negative in 
all years).  For loss makers, profitability (ROA) is negatively related to the premium over book value 
reflected in Tobin’s Q. The converse is true for non-loss makers. Profitability, governance and family 
control all positively impact Tobin’s Q. Although these effects are lower for family firms with good 
governance. The evidence for Model (3) is consistent with the initial analysis and Model (2) and suggests 
earnings and book value have a role in valuation and there is more emphasis on earnings for family firms 
and firms with higher governance.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
Finally, we consider the role of non-family block holders. Lins et al. (2013) find some evidence 
that firms controlled by non-family block holders outperformed the market in emerging markets but not 
developed markets. We test for this effect by re-estimating our three models for a sub-sample of firms 
where a family or non-family insider controlled 20% or more of the equity. The results for this analysis 
are reported in Table 8. The return Model (1) is insignificant as before. The results for Models (2) and (3) 
support the earlier analysis that family control has a positive impact on valuation over and above the 
impact of good governance. However, we again find that family control and good governance combined 
slightly offset the impact of each individual factor. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We test the impact of family control and corporate governance on the accounting performance 
and market performance during the GFC. The results suggest that before and during the GFC, family-
firm valuation placed a higher positive weight on earnings and a lower weight on book value relative to 
non-family firms. We find a higher weight on earnings for firms with good governance suggesting good 
governance leads to a perception of higher quality earnings. However, contrary to our expectations, family 
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firms with good governance had a negative impact on the earnings coefficient. That is, investors do not 
perceive earnings of family firms with good governance as more value relevant than for non-family firms, 
but they may be less value relevant particularly during the GFC. This is consistent with the prior work of 
Lemmon and Lins’ (2003) study of family ownership on firm performance during the AFC of July 1997.  
We find the market performance of good-governance firms relies more on earnings than on the 
balance sheet. Similarly, the market performance of family firms is more reliant on earnings however, 
when good governance is in place, the weight shifts from earnings to book value for family firms. This 
may be because the market perceives it is easier to manipulate earnings rather than the balance sheet 
numbers in times of crisis. It also implies that family control and good governance are substitute but not 
complementary control mechanisms in firms. Contrary to prior studies (McConnell and Servaes 1990; 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988), we do not find that family firms display a significantly higher Tobin’s 
Q than non-family firms.  Firms displaying Q’s greater than unity are judged as using scarce resources 
effectively and those with Q’s less than unity as using resources poorly (Lewellen and Badrinath 1997).  
Family firms are no more efficient during the GFC than were other firms. We do find that profitability 
drives the level of Tobin’s Q (a negative relationship driven by the loss makers in the sample) and that 
this relationship is less for family and good-governance firms. If Tobin’s Q is a proxy for growth options 
(expected future growth) then these results suggest that family firms and firms with better governance 
have lower growth options. 
We conclude that earnings for family firms, with good governance, are perceived as less reliable 
than non-family firms in times of crisis. Governance has a positive impact, increasing the earnings weight 
and reducing the book value weights in valuation model, but for family firms with good governance the 
positive earnings weight is reduced relative to non-family firms. This result is consistent with the market 
expecting sub-optimal decisions by family firms aimed at preserving their SEW rather than maximising 
firm value. While we find a positive governance effect, consistent with the evidence of Lohe and Calabrò 
(2017), the governance impact is not as strong as for non-family firms. 
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The follow-on research question from this study is whether family firms can make changes to their 
governance structure that would reduce the perception that expropriations or SEW preservation occurs 
during times of financial crisis. Specifically, would ensuring the Chair of the Board and the Chair of the 
Audit Committee are not members of the “family” increase the perception of the independence of the 
governance structures?  
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TABLE 1: Sample 
Nonfinancial Firms 2293 
Cases with no Revenue (non-trading firms) 1022 
Missing Data: Governance, Value, Age, Financial and Performance   615 
Extreme Outlier Firms Excluded     11 
Final Sample   645 
Family Firms 123 (19%) 
Non-Family Firms 522 (81%) 
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TABLE 2: Corporate Governance Measures 
Variable Name Variable Description 
 BDSIZE Number of directors on the board. 
 INDP Proportion of non-executive independent directors on the board. 
 BDMEET Number of board meetings. 
 DUAL One if the CEO is separate from chair of the board, and zero otherwise. 
 NOM One if the company has a nomination committee, and zero otherwise. 
 REM One if company has a remuneration committee, and zero otherwise. 
 AUDCHRT One if the company has an audit committee charter, and zero otherwise. 
 AUDSIZE Number of directors on audit committee. 
 AUDIND Proportion of non-executive independent members on the audit committee. 
 AUDEXP Proportion of audit committee members with accounting and finance qualifications. 
 AUDMEET Number of audit committee meetings. 
 AUDITOR One if the auditor is a Big Four, and zero otherwise. 
 
  
Corporate Governance and Family Firm Performance During the Global Financial Crisis. 
29 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., & McNamara, R. (2019). Corporate governance and family firm performance during the Global Financial Crisis. Accounting and 
Finance, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12508. 
This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. 
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics 
    Pooled   Family Firms   Non-Family Firms   ANOVAa   
Variable Definition/Period Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev.   F-stat Sig.   


















0.07 0.788  
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1.42 0.234  






0.92 0.339  






0.02 0.891  


















0.24 0.625  






1.26 0.261  






2.84 0.093 * 






2.13 0.145  












1.56 0.212  






1.56 0.212  






15.21 0.000 *** 






1.46 0.227  
GovIndex Governance Index 0 to 12, t = 2007 5.37 3.08   5.48 2.87   5.36 3.13   0.160 0.690   
Notes: n = 645: 123 family firms; 522 non-family firms. ASX listed during the financial years of 2007-2009. All variables are measured at fiscal year-end for period indicated.  
a ANOVA compares family and non-family firms for all variables. One tailed t-stat: ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
+ Note that the pooled percentage of firms with good governance is 28% and higher than 25% a quartile split would imply due to the underlying index being a nominal scale and 
hence the cut for the quartile was between 8 and 9 on the 12-point scale. 
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TABLE 4: Family Control, Governance and Value Drivers 
  (1) Return   (2) Price   (3) Tobin’s Q   
Variables 2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   
X -0.074  0.113  -0.063  5.392 *** 3.675 *** 1.493 ***       
 (-0.140)  (0.400)  (-0.210)  (7.140)  (5.260)  (2.990)        
X*FF -0.029  -0.172  0.074  4.833 *** 0.193  2.800 **       
 (-0.040)  (-0.400)  (0.150)  (3.070)  (0.120)  (2.320)        
X*GOV -0.103  -0.168  0.088  7.792 *** 7.438 *** 8.134 ***       
 (-0.190)  (-0.580)  (0.270)  (8.730)  (9.370)  (13.300)        
X*FF*GOV -0.016  0.042  0.266  -13.858 *** -8.081 *** -9.473 ***       
 (-0.020)  (0.070)  (0.410)  (-6.090)  (-4.040)  (-5.810)        
BV       1.211 *** 1.040 *** 0.985 ***       
       (5.370)  (5.440)  (6.550)        
BV*FF       -0.694  0.610  -0.115        
       (-1.410)  (1.260)  (-0.340)        
BV*GOV       -1.143 *** -1.089 *** -1.153 ***       
       (-4.580)  (-5.370)  (-7.080)        
BV*FF*GOV       1.800 *** 0.105  0.696 *       
       (3.170)  (0.190)  (1.740)        
ROA             -0.572 *** 0.001  -0.532 *** 
             (-3.740)  (0.040)  (-3.000)  
ROA*FF             -0.049  -0.345  -0.773 ** 
             (-0.060)  (-1.120)  (-2.180)  
ROA*GOV             1.079  1.624 *** 1.115 * 
             (0.950)  (2.020)  (1.910)  
ROA*FF*GOV             2.493  0.281  0.225  
             (0.580)  (0.210)  (0.170)  
SIZE -0.102  0.039  0.052  0.257  0.127  0.138  -0.881 *** -0.898 *** -0.683 *** 
 (-0.890)  (0.610)  (0.790)  (1.590)  (0.950)  (1.290)  (-4.280)  (-6.690)  (-5.220)  
LEV -0.389  -0.287  -0.268  -0.516  -0.249  -0.154  -1.119  1.604 *** 1.480 *** 
 (-1.020)  (-1.570)  (-1.920)  (-1.080)  (-0.680)  (-0.730)  (-1.480)  (3.660)  (5.140)  
AGE 0.000  0.006  -0.003  -0.022 *** -0.014 *** -0.001  -0.003  0.007  0.003  
 (0.030)  (2.110)  (-0.870)  (-3.990)  (-2.580)  (-0.290)  (-0.370)  (1.170)  (0.530)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Overall R2 0.011  0.017  0.005  0.812  0.787  0.770  0.125  0.070  0.154  
F-stat 0.85   1.13   0.88   241.2 *** 215.7 *** 194.9 *** 8.77 *** 7.91 *** 14.7 *** 
Notes: All models n= 645. Two tail t-stat in parentheses: ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Intercept included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors. See Table 3 for variable definitions.   
Model 1 is a returns model: 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
Model 2 is a levels model: 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   
Model 3 is a levels model: 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Corporate Governance and Family Firm Performance During the Global Financial Crisis. 
31 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., & McNamara, R. (2019). Corporate governance and family firm performance during the Global Financial Crisis. Accounting and 
Finance, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12508. 





TABLE 5: Returns Model for Loss Makers versus Non-Loss Makers 
  Loss Makers   Non-Loss Makers   
Variables 2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   
X 3.829 * 0.310  -2.044 ** -0.020  0.247  0.050  
 (1.700)  (0.400)  (-2.410)  (-0.040)  (1.060)  (0.130)  
X*FF 2.516  -0.694  8.812 *** -0.232  -0.213  -0.038  
 (0.530)  (-0.140)  (2.680)  (-0.340)  (-0.660)  (-0.060)  
X*GOV -2.154  1.762  3.598 * 0.166  -0.202  -0.031  
 (-0.560)  (0.560)  (1.950)  (0.350)  (0.860)  (-0.080)  
X*FF*GOV -3.966  -2.717  -5.523  0.145  0.173  0.277  
 (-0.310)  (-0.140)  (-1.290)  (0.160)  (0.410)  (0.350)  
SIZE 0.548  0.260 * 0.060  -0.362 *** -0.063  0.115  
 (2.290)  (1.860)  (0.740)  (-2.680)  (-0.950)  (0.960)  
LEV 0.261  -0.017  -0.119  -0.609  -0.296  -0.585  
 (0.410)  (-0.050)  (-1.050)  (-1.290)  (-1.430)  (-1.580)  
AGE 0.004  0.008  -0.004  -0.002  0.005 ** -0.002  
 (0.460)  (1.210)  (-0.890)  (-0.380)  (2.280)  (-0.350)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.0348  0.0306  0.0539  0.0341  0.037  0.0095  
F-stat 1.26   0.8   2.81 *** 2.38 ** 1.35   0.57   
Notes: Loss Makers n= 300, Non-Loss Makers n=345. Two tail t-stat in parentheses: ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels respectively. Intercept included but not reported. Robust standard errors. See Table 3 for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 6: Price Model for Loss Makers versus Non-Loss Makers 
  Loss Makers   Non-Loss Makers   
Variables 2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   
X -2.420 ** -0.072  -0.332  7.028 *** 6.295 *** 1.652 ** 
 (-2.060)  (-0.140)  (-0.490)  (6.220)  (5.500)  (2.400)  
X*FF -6.398 ** -26.305 *** -16.334 *** 6.769 *** 2.247  4.524 ** 
 (-2.020)  (-6.180)  (-6.330)  (2.840)  (0.970)  (2.340)  
X*GOV -0.845  -2.811  1.083  6.631 *** 5.156 *** 8.121 *** 
 (-0.300)  (-1.220)  (0.650)  (5.110)  (4.170)  (9.770)  
X*FF*GOV 5.480  106.481 *** 11.766 ** -16.337 *** -10.217 *** -11.504 *** 
 (0.490)  (4.510)  (2.350)  (-5.050)  (-3.640)  (-4.800)  
BV 1.088 *** 2.324 *** 1.726 *** 1.014 *** 0.596 ** 0.948 *** 
 (3.080)  (6.240)  (5.410)  (3.140)  (2.160)  (4.580)  
BV*FF -0.286  2.283 *** 0.073  -1.563 ** -0.466  -0.732  
 (-0.310)  (3.230)  (0.220)  (-2.110)  (-0.660)  (-1.280)  
BV*GOV -0.874  -1.335 ** -0.125  -0.960 *** -0.657 ** -1.125 *** 
 (-1.080)  (-2.240)  (-0.230)  (-2.680)  (-2.270)  (-5.080)  
BV*FF*GOV NA#  NA#  NA#  2.738 *** 1.215  1.344 ** 
       (3.300)  (1.570)  (2.130)  
SIZE 0.356 *** 0.213 * 0.143 * 0.165  -0.053  0.049  
 (3.060)  (1.860)  (1.800)  (0.580)  (-0.220)  (0.240)  
LEV 0.094  0.566 *** 0.076  -0.532  -1.114  -0.474  
 (0.350)  (2.740)  (0.860)  (-0.590)  (-1.500)  (-0.760)  
AGE -0.006  0.000  -0.003  -0.026 *** -0.015 * 0.001  
 (-1.430)  (-0.070)  (-0.910)  (-3.160)  (-1.890)  (0.100)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.291  0.545  0.432  0.824  0.813  0.778  
F-stat 11.71 *** 32.4 *** 21.19 *** 137.65 *** 127.43 *** 103.07 *** 
Notes: Loss Makers n= 300, Non-Loss Makers n=345. Two tail t-stat in parentheses: ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels 
respectively. Intercept included but not reported. Robust standard errors. See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Price model: 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   
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TABLE 7: Tobin’s Q Model Loss Makers versus Non-Loss Makers 
  Loss Makers   Non-Loss Makers   
Variables 2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   
ROA -0.455 ** 0.022  -0.322  2.158 *** 0.069  0.991 *** 
 (-2.160)  (0.380)  (-1.220)  (4.500)  (1.050)  (3.820)  
ROA*FF -1.220  -0.228  -0.665  8.498 *** 2.767 *** 0.738 *** 
 (-0.980)  (-0.540)  (-1.220)  (7.210)  (4.080)  (2.710)  
ROA*GOV -0.247  0.651  0.816  4.413 *** 4.581 *** 3.178 *** 
 (-0.140)  (0.530)  (0.940)  (3.900)  (5.260)  (5.990)  
ROA*FF*GOV -9.934  -23.526  11.680  -8.347 *** -7.457 *** -5.272 *** 
 (-0.080)  (-0.110)  (0.280)  (-3.370)  (-6.050)  (-8.010)  
SIZE -1.734 *** -1.781 *** -1.533 *** -0.340 *** -0.085  -0.151 *** 
 (-3.220)  (-5.170)  (-4.350)  (-2.550)  (-0.910)  (-2.840)  
LEV -0.482  2.817 *** 1.514 *** -1.213 * -0.535  0.068  
 (-0.330)  (3.630)  (3.150)  (-2.300)  (-1.550)  (0.380)  
AGE 0.005  0.023  0.002  -0.009 ** -0.003  -0.002  
 (0.210)  (1.480)  (0.120)  (-1.920)  (-0.770)  (-0.920)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.077  0.107  0.170  0.341  0.141  0.211  
F-stat 3.25 *** 6.71 *** 7.42 *** 21.13 *** 6.75 *** 12.07 *** 
Notes: Loss Makers n= 300, Non-Loss Makers n=345. Two tail t-stat in parentheses: ***, **, * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels 
respectively. Intercept included but not reported. Robust standard errors.  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8: Inside Block holders Governance, Family Control and Valuation 
  (1) Return   (2) Price   (3) Tobin’s Q   
Variables 2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   2007   2008   2009   
X -0.620  0.413  0.010  4.748 ** 3.432 * 0.448        
 (-0.660)  (0.920)  (0.040)  (2.570)  (1.940)  (0.900)        
X*FF 0.561  -0.439  0.043  7.721 *** 0.908  5.720 ***       
 (0.560)  (-0.900)  (0.120)  (3.350)  (0.380)  (5.970)        
X*GOV 1.124  -0.543  -0.054  5.595 * 3.256  8.320 ***       
 (1.070)  (-1.130)  (-0.150)  (1.960)  (1.290)  (7.340)        
X*FF*GOV -1.072  0.301  0.656  -18.821 *** -5.871 * -13.946 ***       
 (-0.820)  (0.480)  (1.170)  (-5.230)  (-1.750)  (-8.550)        
BV       0.790 * 0.505  0.703 ***       
       (1.930)  (1.520)  (4.150)        
BV*FF       -1.104 * 0.946  -0.509 *       
       (-1.880)  (1.580)  (-1.800)        
BV*GOV       0.150  0.811  -1.073 ***       
       (0.230)  (1.260)  (-3.480)        
BV*FF*GOV       1.773 ** -1.554 * 1.321 ***       
       (2.140)  (-1.790)  (3.190)        
ROA             -0.821 ** -0.586 * 0.124  
             (-2.130)  (-1.740)  (0.590)  
ROA*FF             1.002  -0.299  -2.263 *** 
             (1.000)  (-1.060)  (-6.970)  
ROA*GOV             4.378  1.341  4.502 ** 
             (1.380)  (0.730)  (2.410)  
ROA*FF*GOV             -1.863  7.659 ** 1.179  
             (-0.340)  (2.330)  (0.390)  
SIZE -0.107  0.070  0.011  0.595 ** 0.287  0.259 * -1.058 *** -0.345  -0.575 *** 
 (-0.650)  (0.850)  (0.140)  (2.390)  (1.080)  (1.990)  (-2.840)  (-1.570)  (-3.650)  
LEV -0.968  -0.164  -0.074  -1.019  -0.171  -0.184  -2.804 ** -1.141 * 1.319 *** 
 (-1.940)  (-0.670)  (-0.480)  (-1.430)  (-0.240)  (-0.760)  (-2.190)  (-1.670)  (3.890)  
AGE 0.001  0.005  -0.002  -0.013  -0.007  -0.001  -0.026 * -0.003  -0.004  
 (0.200)  (1.360)  (-0.630)  (-1.450)  (-0.700)  (-0.220)  (-1.680)  (-0.370)  (-0.560)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.0206  0.0212  0.0215  0.7807  0.644  0.7534  0.1612  0.1572  0.3695  
F 0.89   0.71   0.58   74.35 *** 39.8 *** 62.15 *** 4.49 *** 3.97 *** 19.99 *** 
Notes: Blockholder firms with ownership greater than or equal to 20%, n= 237: 96 Family Firms and 141 non-Family Firms. Two tail t-stat in parentheses: ***, **, * Significant at 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Intercept included but not reported. Robust standard errors.  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
Model 1 is a returns model: 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
Model 2 is a levels model: 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   
Model 3 is a levels model: 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
